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Are Drone Strikes Effective in Afghanistan and Pakistan? 




Strikes by unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have been the primary weapon used by the 
United States to combat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This paper 
examines the dynamics of violence involving drone strikes and the Taliban/Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan from January 2007 to December 2010. We find that drone strikes 
do not have any significant impact on terrorist violence in Afghanistan but that drone strikes 
do have a significant impact on Taliban/Al-Qaeda violence in Pakistan. We find that our 
results are robust to examining different time periods and lag structures.  We also examine 
the impact of successful and unsuccessful drone strikes (which did or did not succeed in 
targeted killing of a militant leader) on terrorist attacks by the Taliban. We find strong 
negative impacts of unsuccessful drone strikes on Taliban violence in Pakistan, showing the 
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research visit in Summer 2011. Attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have been one of the main policies used by the
United States to carry out targeted killings of terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The perceived
success of these attacks has led to a substantial increase in the use of drones as a strategic tool of the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and its military around the globe.1 In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
targets are typically Taliban and Al-Qaeda militant leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) of Northwest Pakistan. And although drone strikes have killed important Taliban leaders, their
use is unpopular in Pakistan due to the \collateral" civilian casualties often associated with them, as
well as possible retaliation against civilians by the Taliban. For example, in a terrorist attack on a police
academy in Lahore in March 2009 in which eighteen people were killed, Baitullah Mehsud (then leader of
the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) stated that the attack was \in retaliation for the continued drone strikes
by the United States in collaboration with Pakistan on our people."2
While the primary strategic goal of U.S. drone strikes in the FATA is to incapacitate the Al-Qaeda and
eliminate its capacity to attack the U.S., subsidiary goals must also be to reduce terrorist attacks by the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and to assure security of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons. Thus, long-run chances of success for the U.S. and its allies in the region are surely
diminished by continued reprisal terrorist attacks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda against Pakistanis and
Afghanis. This paper examines the extent to which drone strikes aect subsequent violence by the Taliban
and Al-Qaeda { in particular, whether the number and incidence of terrorist attacks increases (through
in retaliation and reprisal) or decreases (due to incapacitation and deterrence). Following Jaeger and
Paserman's (2006, 2008, 2009) work on the Second Intifada in Israel, we exploit daily variation in drone
strikes and terrorist attacks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan from January
2007 to December 2010 to estimate vector autoregressions of the dynamic patterns of violence. We also
empirically test the hypothesis of whether there is co-ordination in Taliban violence across the border in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.3
We contribute to the literatures on counterterrorism measures and asymmetric conict by examining
the ecacy of U.S. counter-terrorism policy (drone strikes) to combat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and
examine whether the use drone strikes aects terrorist actions in Afghanistan, where the US is directly
1 Washington Post, 28 December 2011,\Under Obama, An Emerging Global Apparatus for Drone Killing," http://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/under-obama-an-emerging-global-apparatus-for-drone-killing/
2011/12/13/gIQANPdILP_story.html, last accessed 28 December 2011.
2BBC, 31 March 2009, \Lahore `was Pakistan Taleban op'," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7973540.stm,
last accessed 28 December 2011.
3The Taliban are comprised of Pashtun tribes located in the border areas of Afghanistan (south and south east areas)
and Pakistan (north and north west areas). While there are dierent factions within the Taliban, a general perception is
that there is co-ordination in Taliban violence across the two countries.
1engaged with the Taliban, and in Pakistan, where, except for the FATA, the U.S. is not directly engaged
with the Taliban. We nd that there is no signicant impact of drone strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaeda
attacks in Afghanistan but that there is a signicant impact of drone strikes on Taliban and Al-Qaeda
attacks in Pakistan. This impact varies from a positive vengeance eect in the rst week following a
drone strike to a negative deterrent/incapacitation eect in the second week following a drone strike,
when we examine the likelihood of a terrorist attack by the Taliban. The impact is negative in both the
rst and second weeks following a drone strike, when we examine the number of terrorist attacks by the
Taliban. We nd that drone strikes continue to have a strong impact on terrorist attacks by the Taliban
and Al-Qaeda in Pakistan when we look at dierent time periods or lag structures.
In Section 1 of the paper we describe the background of the conict involving the Taliban and Al-Qaeda
and in Section 2 we describeour data sources. Section 3 presents our econometric approach and Section
4 gives the baseline estimation results. In Section 5 we perform some robustness checks on the baseline
estimation results and in Section 6 we present some extensions regarding successful and unsuccesful drone
strikes as well as actions by specic terrorist actors. Section 7 concludes.
1 Background
The Taliban consist of ethnic Pashtun tribes found along the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
While the Taliban in Afghanistan are a fairly monolithic group, in Pakistan there are currently several
militant groups which are collectively referred to as Taliban. The most important of these is the Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan which acts as an umbrella movement for various commanders across the South Waziristan
agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has been
particularly active in carrying out terrorist attacks within Pakistan. Another important faction is the
Haqqani faction which operates in the North Waziristan agency of FATA and is more actively involved
in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. The dierent militant groups share resources, expertise, and training
with each other, with Al Qaeda playing an important role by networking between the dierent local
militant factions.
While Pakistan's ocial support for the Taliban ended after September 2001 the Pakistan military
did not enter the FATA till July 2002. This was also the rst time that the Pakistan government had
directly interfered in these areas since gaining independence in 1947. In June 2004 the rst drone strike
in the region was reported by the media. Between 2004 and 2005, the Pakistan military engaged with
the Taliban and suered heavy casualties in the northern areas. In September 2006 Pakistan signed the
2Waziristan accord, a peace deal to end all ghting with the Taliban. The Waziristan Accord was ocially
at an end in July 2007 when the Pakistan military laid siege to the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in the capital
city of Islamabad in which Islamic militants were holed up. Since the Red Mosque siege, there has been a
sharp escalation in terrorist attacks by the Taliban across Pakistan. During this time the number of drone
strikes by the US targeting the Taliban leadership continued. Between February and April 2009 there
was another peace agreement between the Taliban and Pakistan, also known as the Malakand Accord.
In August 2009 a drone strike succeeded in killing Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan, who was succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud. During 2008 and 2009, the Pakistan military was
also involved in four major oenses against the Taliban: from January to May 2008, September to October
2008, May 2009 and October to December 2009.
2 Data
We use the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) database collected by the National Counter
Terrorism Center as our source of terrorist incidents in Afghanistan and Pakistan from January 2007 to
December 2010, where the perpetrators were identied in the database as Taliban.4 As a robustness check
we examine whether the incidents reported by the WITS database are consistent with other databases on
terrorist incidents such as the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland and the RAND Database
of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents.5While we do not nd a perfect correlation in the number of terrorist
attacks carried out by the Taliban in the dierent databases, we did nd the WITS database to have
the best coverage of such incidents. For instance, we found an almost perfect correlation between the
suicide attacks attributed to the Taliban in WITS with a proprietary administrative data source which
documented such attacks, while the other databases entirely miss large numbers of such incidents.
Incidents in the WITS database consist of all \incidents in which sub-national or clandestine groups or
individuals deliberately or recklessly attacked civilians or noncombatants (including military personnel and
assets outside war zones and war like settings)." An important consideration concerns what constitutes
a \terrorist act." To be included in the WITS database terrorists must have initiated and executed
the attack, with spontaneous hate crimes and genocides being excluded from the database. A potential
4See https://wits.nctc.gov/.
5The Global Terrorism Database is available at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ and the RAND data are available at
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html.
3problem in using the database is that it is sometimes dicult to separate crime from terrorist act. In
general, a crime committed in support of terrorism is included in the database, but not otherwise.
Data on incidence and fatalities arising from drone strikes comes from the New America Foundation,
which collects and provides data on incidence, day, location, fatalities (including those of militant leaders),
intended target and source of information.6 The sources from which the data is compiled include media
organizations such as the New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, news services and
networks such as the Associated Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, CNN and BBC, English language
media from Pakistan such as the Daily Times, Dawn and the News and GEO TV.
In Table 1 we show the frequency of drone strikes by the U.S. and terrorist attacks by the Taliban
and Al-Qaeda from 2005 to 2010. It is clear that there is an increase in both drone strikes and overall
terrorist attacks in this period, although the share of terrorist attacks occurring in Pakistan has declined.
The success rate of drone strikes has declined substantially, as has the share of suicide attacks in terrorist
actions.
We present this information at a higher frequency in Figure 1, which shows the monthly number of
terrorist attacks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the monthly number
of drone strikes. Vertical lines indicate important time periods of the conict: the Red Mosque siege of
July 2007 in Pakistan, the start of the Obama administration in oce from February 2009, the Malakand
accord from February to April 2009 and the four dierent military campaigns by the Pakistan military
against the insurgents. The frequency of terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan clearly increased
after the Red Mosque siege in 2007. There were large numbers of attacks in 2008 and 2009 but fewer in
2010, after the August 2009 killing of a a key leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, Baitullah Mehsud, in a
drone strike. In Afghanistan, the number of terrorist attacks by the Taliban is about twice as high as in
Pakistan and has increased over time. Note that there is seasonal variation in the terrorist attacks by the
Taliban in Afghanistan with the highest number of attacks occurring during the summer months. Drone
strikes are fewer in number but their use has increased since the start of 2008, and particularly gone up
during 2010. There is a denite increase in the number of drone strikes since the Obama administration
took oce in 2009.
In Figure 2 we show the spatial distribution of the aggregate number of terrorist attacks by the Taliban
and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan across its thirty ve states between January 2007 and December 2010. From
the map, the geographical concentration of terrorist attacks is, not surprisingly, in areas dominated by
6See http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones.
4the Taliban in the south and south east of Afghanistan. Similarly, Figure 3 gives the spatial distribution
of the aggregate number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan across its four states between January 2007
and December 2010. From this, it can be seen that most of the terrorist attacks are geographically
concentrated in the north and north west of the country, close to the FATA where the drone strikes take
place.
Because Al-Qaeda has directly claimed responsibility for a very small number of terrorist attacks (4
in Afghanistan and 9 in Pakistan in our sample period), in the rest of the paper we will refer to the
\Taliban" as the terrorist actor in the analysis.
3 Framework and Econometric Strategy
To examine the eects of drone strikes on Taliban violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we posit a simple
vector autoregressive model similar to that of Jaeger and Paserman (2008). We are particularly interested
in whether drone strikes reduce subsequent Taliban violence For the Taliban in Afghanistan, we estimate
















t and Dt represent period t terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan, terrorist attacks
by the Taliban in Pakistan and drone strikes, respectively, p is the maximum number of lags that have a
non-zero eect and Xt is a vector of variables that may shift the reaction function up or down or change
the parameters of the reaction function. For the sake of symmetry we also estimate and report the reaction






Note, however, that it is unlikely (as we also nd in the data) that drone strikes are strategically aected
by the incidence and intensity of terrorist attacks by the Taliban in either Afghanistan or Pakistan, and
more likely based on intelligence gathered on high value Taliban and terrorist targets. To the extent that
this intelligence gathering (and the timing of drone strikes) is independent the unobserved determinants
5of Taliban actions, our estimates of these parameters in the Taliban reaction functions can be viewed the
causal eects of drone strikes on Taliban actions (Granger 1969).
In both of the Taliban equations, we pay particular attention to the signs of the coecients. We
hypothesize that drone strikes can lead to subsequent reductions in terrorist activity if they incapacitate
the Taliban or deter the Taliban from further violence. On the other hand, drone strikes may induce
further violence through vengeance. If the coecients on the Dt 1;:::;Dt p variables are negative, then
the incapacitation and deterrence eects dominate (on net) while if they are positive then the vengeance
eect dominates (on net). We also estimate a specication (in section 6) in which we separate successful
drone strikes (ones which killed a militant leader) from those which were not successful (one which did not
kill a militant leader). We expect the coecients associated with successful drone strikes to capture the
incapacitation, deterrence and vengeance eects while the coecients associated with unsuccessful drone
strikes potentially capture the deterrence and vengeance eects only, provided of course that unsuccessful
drone strikes do not have any impact on the operational capabilities of the Taliban. Our empirical
strategy also allows us to test whether there is any co-ordination in Taliban violence across the border
in Afghanistan and Pakistan by exploiting geographic variation in drone strikes, and examine whether
drone strikes in Pakistan aect terrorism in Afghanistan and whether drone strikes in Afghanistan aect
terrorism in Pakistan.
4 Baseline Estimation Results
We estimate the reaction functions (as dened in Section 3) by estimating OLS regressions where we
correct for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error terms using Newey-West standard
errors. We choose a lag length of twenty one days in our baseline estimation, where the choice of lag
length is based on likelihood ratio tests that we carried out on the initial estimations. We estimate two
dierent specications: in the rst specication (which we refer to as the incidence specication), TA
t , TP
t
and Dt are dummy variables for whether there was any terrorist attack by the Taliban in Afghanistan,
by the Taliban in Pakistan or whether there was any drone strike on day t. In the second specication
(which we refer to as the levels specication), TA
t , TP
t and Dt are the number of terrorist attacks by the
Taliban in Afghanistan, by the Taliban in Pakistan and the number of drone strikes on day t.
All regressions include day of week indicators and a series of indicators variables to control for dierent
periods in the conict: a) a dummy variable that takes the value one after the Red Mosque siege of fourth
July 2007, b) a dummy variable which takes the value one for after the Obama administration took oce
6from twenty rst January 2009, c) a dummy variable which takes the value one during the time of the
Malakand accord from fteenth February to thirteenth April 2009 and d) dummy variables for each of
four military campaigns undertaken by the Pakistan military against the insurgents.7
Table 2 gives the estimation results of the drone strikes reaction functions. The second column in the
table gives the estimation results from the incidence specication while the fourth gives estimation results
from the levels specication. We nd that a drone strike is 5:2% more likely to occur fourteen days after
a terrorist attack by the Taliban in Afghanistan and 4:4% more likely to occur nine days after a terrorist
attack by the Taliban in Pakistan and these increases are statistically signicant at the 2:5% level of
signicance. There are 0:010 fewer drone strikes fteen days after one terrorist attack by the Taliban in
Afghanistan. There are 0:040 fewer drone strikes four days after one terrorist attack by the Taliban in
Pakistan (everything else constant) and 0:028 fewer drone strikes eighteen days after one terrorist attack
by the Taliban in Pakistan (everything else constant). These declines are statistically signicant at the
2:5% level of signicance. At the same time, there are 0:013 more drone strikes eighteen days after one
terrorist attack by the Taliban in Afghanistan (everything else constant) and 0:025 more drone strikes nine
days after one terrorist attack by the Taliban in Pakistan (everything else constant). We do not nd that
the all coecients on lags of terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan or all coecients on lags of
terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan to be jointly signicantly dierent from zero in the incidence
specication. We do nd that all coecients on lags of terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan
and all coecients on lags of terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan are jointly signicantly dierent
from zero in the levels specication.
Table 3 gives the estimation results of the reaction functions of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The
second column gives the estimation results when using the incidence specication while the fourth column
gives the coecients when using the levels specication. These reaction functions give two important
results: rst there is some evidence that more terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan reduce terrorist
attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan and second that drone strikes have no impact on terrorist attacks
by the Taliban in Afghanistan. From Table 3 we nd that terrorist attacks in Afghanistan are 5:4%
less likely to occur eight days after a terrorist attack by the Taliban in Pakistan and this decrease is
statistically signicant at the 1% level. There is no signicant impact of drone strikes on terrorist attacks
by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and we do not nd that the coecients on all lags of drone strikes or
coecients on all lags of terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan in the incidence specication are
7These military campaigns occur from rst January to thirty rst May 2008, from twenty third September to thirty rst
October 2008, from rst to thirty rst May 2009 and from eighteenth October to twelfth December 2009.
7jointly signicantly dierent from zero. We do nd that coecients on all lags of terrorist attacks by the
Taliban in Pakistan in the levels specication are jointly signicantly dierent from zero, indicating that
there is likely to be some coordination between the Taliban groups in the two countries.
Table 4 gives the estimation results of the reaction functions of the Taliban in Pakistan, structured
in the same was as in Table 2. We nd strong eects of drone strikes on subsequent Taliban violence
in Pakistan, although the sign of these eects are somewhat mixed. We nd that a terrorist attack by
the Taliban in Pakistan is 8:2% more likely to occur ve days after a drone strike but 8:9% less likely
to occur thirteen days after a drone strike and these eects are statistically signicant at the 2:5% level
of signicance. There are also 0:120 fewer terrorist attacks two days after a drone strike and 0:130
fewer terrorist attacks twelve days after a drone strike. These eects are signicant at the 1% level.
When we test for joint signicance of all lags of drone strikes on terrorist attacks by the Taliban in
Pakistan we nd that these lags are jointly signicant in explaining such attacks in both the incidence
and levels specications. We also nd that Taliban violence in Pakistan is negatively associated with
Taliban violence in Afghanistan; a terrorist attack is 9:3% less likely to occur sixteen days after a terrorist
attack in Afghanistan and 0:023 fewer terrorist attacks occur sixteen days after one terrorist attack in
Afghanistan. In a test of joint signicance of all lags of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan we nd these lags
to be jointly signicant in the levels specication but not in the incidence specication.
We next carry out a number of robustness checks to determine whether these baseline results persist
when we when we vary the lag structure, the level of aggregation, and focus on lethal Taliban attacks.8
5 Robustness Checks
5.1 Lag Structures
It is possible that the baseline Granger-causality results that we reported are dependent on the lag length
that we chose in the estimation of our reaction functions. We chose the lag length based on likelihood ratio
statistics. To check the robustness of our results, however, we also examine whether choosing a dierent
lag length would change our results. In Table 5, we present results using lags of seven and fourteen days.
Overall, we nd little change by estimating models with p = 7 or p = 14.
8In results available from the authors by request, we have also estimated the baseline specications only for the 2008-2010
period, when drone strikes began to be used in signicant numbers, as well as the period after the Red Mosque Siege in July
2007, which was a triggering event for elevated terrorist activity. The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in
Tables 2 through 4.
85.2 Time Aggregation
In our baseline specication, we examined the short-run (3 week) dynamics of violence and found that
there is little eect of drone strikes on Taliban actions in Afghanistan and a signicant, but somewhat
mixed, eect on Taliban actions in Pakistan. Unlike the Palestinians in Israel we expect that the Taliban
has somewhat greater ability to act in Afghanistan, in particular. But it may be that using high-frequency
data masks some longer-term reaction (or deterrence) of Taliban actions. To explore this issue, we estimate
models similar to those in Tables 2 through 4, but using weekly and monthly aggregation of the data.
Here we nd some dierences with our baseline specication. In particular, we nd no signicant eects
of drone strikes on Taliban violence in Pakistan when we aggregate to weeks or months. At the monthly
frequency, we do nd a signicant eect of drone strikes on Taliban violence in Afghanistan. In this
regression, the coecient on drone strikes is negatively and highly signicant { indicating that drone
strikes may have a deterrence or incapacitation eect on longer-run violence in Afghanistan.
5.3 Outcome Measure
We have thus far measured intensity of Taliban actions only by using the incidence or number of terrorist
attacks. To explore this issue further, we now look at two somewhat dierent outcomes by examining
either those Taliban actions that resulted in at least one fatality as well as only those in which a suicide
attack occurred. We use data on incident description and fatalities in WITS to construct the incidence
and number of lethal and suicide terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan and in Pakistan.
The tests of joint signicance are reported in table 7. The eect of drone strikes on both lethal and
suicide attacks in Afghanistan is similar to the baseline specication { there is no eect on either incidence
or levels. The results in Pakistan are somewhat more mixed, where we nd that drone strikes have a
jointly signicant (at the 5% level) eect on lethal attacks, but no signicant eect on either the incidence
or level of suicide attacks there. This is consistent with the evidence from the Palestinian-Israeli conict,
where Jaeger and Paserman (2009) found that Israeli counter-terrorism measures had little predictive
power for suicide attacks, perhaps because suicide attacks take longer to organize than other types of
violence and require elements of surprise in order to be eective.
96 Extensions
6.1 Haqqani and Mehsud Factions of the Taliban
So far we have considered the Taliban to be a monolithic group, with the only distinction being in terrorist
attacks carried out across the border in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. Two distinct factions within the
Taliban have been targeted by drone strikes in recent years, however, and these factions have a base of
operations in dierent parts of the FATA. The Haqqani faction of the Taliban is based in North Waziristan
while the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (thereafter referred to as the Mehsud faction of the Taliban) is based
in South Waziristan areas of FATA. Drone strikes carried out in North Waziristan target the Haqqani
faction while drone strikes in South Waziristan target the Mehsud faction. The Haqqani faction of the
Taliban is believed to carry out terrorist attacks in parts of Afghanistan while the Mehsud faction is
believed to carry out terrorist attacks in the FATA areas of Pakistan. We estimate reaction functions for
each faction by using geographical information on terrorist attacks and drone strikes. We estimate the
reaction function for the Haqqani faction of the Taliban by using data on terrorist attacks by the Taliban
in parts of Afghanistan which are believed to be the Haqqani areas of combat operations; these include the
eastern states of Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Kabul in Afghanistan. We estimate
reaction functions for the Mehsud faction of the Taliban by using data on terrorist attacks by the Taliban
in the FATA areas of Pakistan which are believed to be the Mehsud areas of combat operations.














t represents terrorist attacks by the Taliban in the eastern states of Khost, Paktia, Paktika,
Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Kabul in Afghanistan at time t and D
Haqqani
t represents drone strikes in
North Waziristan at time t. As above, p is the maximum number of lags that have a non-zero eect and
Xt is a vector of variables that may shift the reaction function up or down or change the parameters of
the reaction function.
Our empirical strategy is similar to before, with estimation of empirical reaction functions by OLS with
twenty-one lags and Newey-West standard errors. The estimation results are reported in table 8, with the
second column giving the estimation results from the incidence specication and the fourth column giving
the estimation results from the levels specication. A terrorist attack in the Haqqani areas in eastern
Afghanistan is 14:1% more likely to occur eight days after a drone strike in North Waziristan, indicating
10the vengeance eect dominates the incapacitation/deterrence eect. At the same time there are 0:183
fewer terrorist attacks two days after one drone strike in North Waziristan, ceteris paribus and 0:213 more
terrorist attacks nine days after one drone strike in North Waziristan (everything else constant). Overall,
there appear to be short-term deterrent/incapacitation eect of drone strikes in the rst week but large
vengeance eects in the second week following a drone strike for the Haqqani faction of the Taliban.








t represents terrorist attacks by the Taliban in the FATA areas of Pakistan at time t and
DMehsud
t represents drone strikes in South Waziristan at time t. p is the maximum number of lags that
have a non-zero eect and Xt is a vector of variables that may shift the reaction function up or down or
change the parameters of the reaction function.
The estimation results are reported in table 9, with the second column giving the estimation results
from the incidence specication and the fourth column giving the estimation results from the levels
specication. We nd that a terrorist attack in FATA is 17:3% more likely eleven days after a drone strike
in South Waziristan but that it is 14:1% less likely fourteen days after a drone strike in South Waziristan.
There are also 0:142 more terrorist attacks fourteen days after a drone strike (everything else constant).
Overall there appear to be vengeance eects but also large deterrent/incapacitation eects occurring in
the second week after a drone strikes for the Mehsud faction of the Taliban.
6.2 Successful and Unsuccessful Drone Strikes
Jaeger and Paserman (2009) found dierential eects of successful and unsuccessful assassination attempts
of Palestinian leaders. We employ a similar strategy here by exploiting information on whether or not a
particular drone strike was successful in eliminating a militant leader. By decomposing the drone strikes
into those which were successful and not successful, we are able to investigate the individual deterrence
and incapacitation eects of drone strikes on terrorist violence.













t represent drone strikes which were successful and which were not successful in killing
a militant leader at time t, respectively. p is The estimation results are reported in table 10, with the
second column giving the estimation results from the incidence specication and the fourth column giving
the estimation results from the levels specication. We nd that there is no large and signicant impact
of unsuccessful drone strikes on terrorist attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan, but a terrorist attack in
Afghanistan is 8:8% more likely ve days after a successful drone strike. This indicates that vengeance
eects may be particularly strong when drone strikes are able to kill militant leaders for Taliban violence
in Afghanistan.











with the variables dened as above. The estimation results are reported in table 11, with the second
column giving the estimation results from the incidence specication and the fourth column giving the
estimation results from the levels specication. We nd that a terrorist attack in Pakistan is 17:8% less
likely to occur three days after a successful drone strike, but also that a terrorist attack in Pakistan is 13%
less likely to occur twelve days after an unsuccessful drone strike and that there are 0:151 fewer terrorist
attacks in Pakistan eleven days after one unsuccessful drone strike (all else constant). These eects are
statistically signicant. Note, however, that the magnitude of all the coecients is not very dierent across
successful and unsuccessful drone strikes. It appears that there is little incapacitation eect of the Taliban
due to a lost militant leader. On the other hand, strong negative eects associated with unsuccessful drone
strikes indicate a potential eect of drone strikes for Taliban violence in Pakistan. This is also consistent
with conventional wisdom, while the drone strikes may do little to damage the operational capabilities
of the Taliban (there are always other Taliban recruits to take the place of a militant leader killed in a
drone strike), but the show of strength through these strikes may reduce subsequent terrorist attacks by
the Taliban in Pakistan.
7 Conclusion
We examine the dynamics of the conict involving the Taliban across Afghanistan and Pakistan and the
use of drone strikes as a counter-terrorism policy to combat the Taliban. We test the following hypotheses:
do the Taliban increase or decrease terrorist attacks following drone strikes which target militant leaders
12of the Taliban? How do the impacts dier across the border in attacks carried out by the Taliban in
Afghanistan and attacks carried out by the Taliban in Pakistan? Is there a cycle of violence associated
with the use of drone strikes by the United States government in Pakistan? Does U.S. policy to combat
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (in the form of drone strikes) have some impact on terrorist activities of the
Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan?
We nd that there is little signicant impact of drone strikes on Taliban attacks in Afghanistan but
that there is a signicant impact of drone strikes on Taliban attacks in Pakistan. This impact varies from
a positive vengeance eect in the rst week following a drone strike to a negative deterrent/incapacitation
eect in the second week following a drone strike, when we examine the incidence of terrorist attacks by
the Taliban. The impact is negative in both the rst and second week following a drone strike, when we
examine the number of terrorist attacks by the Taliban.
We also examine whether drone strikes in North Waziristan have an impact on Taliban violence in
parts of Afghanistan under the control of the Haqqani faction of the Taliban. We examine whether drone
strikes in South Waziristan have an impact on Taliban violence in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas under the control of the Mehsud faction of the Taliban. We nd some vengeance eects of drone
strikes on violence by the Haqqani faction but also deterrent/incapacitation eects of drone strikes on
violence by both the Haqqani and Mehsud factions of the Taliban. We estimate the dierential eects
of successful and unsuccessful drone strikes (which kill and do not kill a militant leader) on Taliban
violence in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. We nd strong negative impacts of unsuccessful drone strikes
on Taliban violence in Pakistan, showing the deterrent eects of drone strikes are quite strong while the
incapacitation eects of drone strikes are weak or non-existent.
Our work has relevance for the current US drones policy in Pakistan as well as possible use of the
policy in other parts of the world. It also provides empirical evidence of deterrence eects of a specic
counter-terrorism policy across dierent factions of a larger group with a common ideology (the Taliban).
We nd that these deterrent eects can vary across the dierent factions, with vengeance eects being
stronger for some factions than for others. Insofar as the incapacitation eect of the drone strikes comes
from targeted killing of Taliban leaders, we nd that such an incapacitation eect (in the sense of reducing
Taliban violence) is minimal but that there is some deterrent eect of drone strikes on Taliban violence.
Our most important nding is that drone strikes matter, but only for Taliban violence in Pakistan. There
is little or no eect of drone strikes on Taliban violence across the border in Afghanistan.
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14Figure 1: Monthly Patterns in Terrorist Attacks by the Taliban and Drone Strikes, WITS data from
January 2005 to December 2010
Notes: Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents
Tracking System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center.
15Figure 2: Spatial Patterns in number of Terrorist Attacks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan,
WITS data from January 2005 to December 2010
1 Notes: Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, collected by the National Counterterrorism
Center.
16Figure 3: Spatial Patterns in number of Terrorist Attacks by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Pakistan,
WITS data from January 2005 to December 2010
1 Notes: Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, collected by the National Counterterrorism
Center.
17Table 1: Frequency of Drone Strikes by the U.S. and Terrorist Attacks by Taliban and Al-Qaeda
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of Drone Strikes 2 2 4 34 53 118
of which
Successful 2 0 0 11 9 14
Number of Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan 264 511 636 691 860 1196
of which
Lethal Attacks 179 292 382 381 460 615
Suicide Attacks 7 46 52 58 55 54
Number of Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan 3 18 95 273 290 158
of which
Lethal Attacks 3 14 50 128 149 84
Suicide Attacks 0 0 8 20 26 26
1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source:
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center.
Terrorist incidents are restricted to those where the perpetrator was identied as Taliban
or Al-Qaeda.
2 Successful drone strike is one in which a militant leader is reported killed.
3 Lethal Taliban attack is one with at least one reported casualty.
18Table 2: Daily Drone Strike Reaction Functions
Incidence of Strikes Number of Strikes
Coecient SE Coecient SE
A. Drone Strikes
t   1  0:040 (0:029)  0:006 (0:029)
t   2 0:010 (0:030) 0:001 (0:026)
t   3  0:015 (0:025)  0:041 (0:022)
t   4 0:000 (0:033) 0:035 (0:033)
t   5 0:016 (0:034) 0:034 (0:039)
t   6 0:032 (0:037) 0:026 (0:040)
t   7 0:022 (0:030) 0:056 (0:032)
t   8  0:010 (0:029)  0:018 (0:025)
t   9  0:028 (0:032)  0:018 (0:034)
t   10 0:070
 (0:030) 0:062
 (0:029)
t   11 0:025 (0:036) 0:080 (0:055)
t   12  0:008 (0:030)  0:002 (0:024)
t   13  0:013 (0:030)  0:018 (0:027)
t   14 0:044 (0:031) 0:050 (0:034)
t   15 0:038 (0:034) 0:007 (0:040)
t   16 0:036 (0:038)  0:013 (0:037)
t   17 0:024 (0:029) 0:006 (0:027)
t   18 0:008 (0:035) 0:001 (0:032)
t   19 0:046 (0:028) 0:078
 (0:038)
t   20  0:008 (0:031) 0:021 (0:034)
t   21  0:008 (0:035)  0:021 (0:038)
B. Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Afghanistan
t   1 0:008 (0:018) 0:000 (0:003)
t   2  0:047
 (0:023) 0:004 (0:004)
t   3  0:030 (0:024)  0:006 (0:003)
t   4 0:034 (0:021) 0:007 (0:007)
t   5 0:002 (0:020)  0:005 (0:004)
t   6 0:020 (0:022)  0:004 (0:003)
t   7 0:010 (0:022) 0:007 (0:004)
t   8  0:032 (0:023) 0:005 (0:007)
t   9  0:025 (0:024) 0:002 (0:004)
t   10  0:004 (0:021) 0:001 (0:005)
t   11  0:026 (0:021)  0:007
 (0:003)
t   12  0:012 (0:021)  0:005 (0:003)
t   13  0:017 (0:024)  0:004 (0:004)
t   14 0:052
 (0:022) 0:010 (0:006)
t   15 0:000 (0:021)  0:010
 (0:003)
t   16  0:020 (0:019)  0:001 (0:004)
t   17 0:000 (0:018)  0:002 (0:004)
t   18 0:036
 (0:018) 0:013
 (0:005)
t   19 0:013 (0:021) 0:001 (0:005)
t   20  0:018 (0:021) 0:011
 (0:005)
t   21 0:004 (0:022)  0:005 (0:003)
continued
19Table 2: Daily Drone Strike Reaction Functions
Incidence of Strikes Number of Strikes
Coecient SE Coecient SE
C. Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Pakistan
t   1 0:025 (0:020) 0:005 (0:013)
t   2  0:001 (0:021) 0:009 (0:014)
t   3  0:013 (0:017)  0:016 (0:010)
t   4  0:042
 (0:019)  0:040
 (0:011)
t   5  0:008 (0:015) 0:014 (0:013)
t   6  0:007 (0:019)  0:007 (0:012)
t   7 0:013 (0:017) 0:026 (0:013)
t   8 0:013 (0:020)  0:001 (0:012)
t   9 0:044
 (0:016) 0:025
 (0:011)
t   10  0:006 (0:020) 0:018 (0:014)
t   11 0:022 (0:018) 0:004 (0:015)
t   12 0:009 (0:018) 0:022 (0:014)
t   13 0:005 (0:019)  0:007 (0:014)
t   14 0:002 (0:019) 0:003 (0:013)
t   15 0:021 (0:020) 0:024 (0:014)
t   16 0:001 (0:017)  0:003 (0:014)
t   17 0:005 (0:019) 0:006 (0:012)
t   18  0:005 (0:021)  0:029
 (0:012)
t   19  0:011 (0:017)  0:007 (0:011)
t   20  0:004 (0:016)  0:007 (0:013)
t   21 0:024 (0:015) 0:010 (0:011)
D. Additional Controls
Number of US troops deployed in Afghanistan 0:000
 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000)
Dummy for after Red Mosque Seige (4 July 2007) 0:001 (0:015)  0:011 (0:014)
Dummy for Obama Admin (21 Jan 2009 onwards) 0:005 (0:036) 0:027 (0:048)
Dummy for Malakand Accord (15 Feb to 30 April 2009) 0:016 (0:038) 0:004 (0:055)
1. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1 Jan to 31 May 2008)  0:001 (0:020) 0:012 (0:024)
2. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (23 Sept to 31 Oct 2008) 0:088
 (0:038) 0:121
 (0:050)
3. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1-31 May 2009)  0:040 (0:055)  0:105 (0:058)
4. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (18 Oct to 12 Dec) 2009  0:060
 (0:026)  0:088
 (0:035)
Constant  0:021 (0:063)  0:071 (0:047)
Test of Joint Signicance (p-value)
excluding (B). Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Afghanistan 0:364 0:000

excluding (C). Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Pakistan 0:160 0:002

excluding (B). Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Afghanistan and (C).




1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents Track-
ing System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center. Terrorist incidents are restricted to those where the
perpetrator was identied as Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
2 Sample restricted to 1440 days (number of observations) between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010.
3 Regressions include day of week indicators.
4 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors.
5  signicant at the 5% level,
 signicant at the 2:5% level,
 signicant at the 1% level.
20Table 3: Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Afghanistan
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
A. Drone Strikes
t   1 0:033 (0:028)  0:146 (0:190)
t   2  0:037 (0:029)  0:182 (0:139)
t   3  0:018 (0:030) 0:354 (0:431)
t   4 0:008 (0:028) 0:370 (0:434)
t   5 0:059
 (0:028)  0:447 (0:324)
t   6  0:052 (0:031)  0:013 (0:236)
t   7  0:039 (0:031)  0:098 (0:131)
t   8  0:005 (0:028)  0:069 (0:223)
t   9 0:005 (0:029) 0:230 (0:245)
t   10 0:001 (0:021) 0:539 (0:779)
t   11  0:024 (0:031)  0:208 (0:206)
t   12  0:011 (0:029) 0:027 (0:252)
t   13 0:000 (0:026)  0:205 (0:208)
t   14 0:031 (0:028) 0:077 (0:141)
t   15 0:005 (0:022) 0:390 (0:547)
t   16 0:022 (0:030)  0:294 (0:234)
t   17 0:041 (0:027)  0:317 (0:276)
t   18  0:007 (0:025)  0:017 (0:184)
t   19 0:026 (0:027)  0:101 (0:213)
t   20  0:040 (0:033) 0:043 (0:235)
t   21  0:055
 (0:025)  0:382
 (0:193)
B. Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Afghanistan
t   1 0:076
 (0:032) 0:065
 (0:030)
t   2 0:074
 (0:027) 0:042
 (0:018)
t   3 0:020 (0:030) 0:014 (0:018)
t   4 0:004 (0:026) 0:024 (0:021)
t   5  0:005 (0:028) 0:009 (0:032)
t   6 0:037 (0:030)  0:021 (0:027)
t   7 0:013 (0:023)  0:002 (0:023)
t   8 0:022 (0:026) 0:029 (0:034)
t   9 0:043 (0:029) 0:063
 (0:025)
t   10  0:022 (0:023) 0:019 (0:015)
t   11 0:067
 (0:034)  0:014 (0:045)
t   12 0:047 (0:029) 0:020 (0:017)
t   13 0:019 (0:026) 0:109
 (0:051)
t   14 0:028 (0:029)  0:004 (0:025)
t   15  0:047 (0:029) 0:034 (0:036)
t   16 0:068
 (0:030) 0:021 (0:034)
t   17 0:023 (0:031) 0:044
 (0:016)
t   18  0:023 (0:023) 0:008 (0:025)
t   19 0:035 (0:027) 0:057 (0:038)
t   20 0:043 (0:033) 0:045 (0:026)
t   21  0:001 (0:027) 0:019 (0:037)
continued
21Table 3: Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Afghanistan
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
C. Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Pakistan
t   1 0:026 (0:020) 0:011 (0:058)
t   2  0:002 (0:022)  0:033 (0:046)
t   3  0:034 (0:019)  0:114 (0:065)
t   4 0:003 (0:021) 0:081 (0:061)
t   5 0:024 (0:020)  0:024 (0:095)
t   6 0:001 (0:019)  0:035 (0:057)
t   7  0:006 (0:021)  0:034 (0:061)
t   8  0:054
 (0:019)  0:117
 (0:052)
t   9 0:027 (0:020)  0:055 (0:074)
t   10 0:007 (0:020) 0:009 (0:064)
t   11 0:012 (0:020) 0:055 (0:057)
t   12  0:023 (0:021) 0:117 (0:130)
t   13  0:002 (0:020)  0:026 (0:054)
t   14  0:031 (0:022)  0:031 (0:071)
t   15 0:024 (0:021)  0:028 (0:092)
t   16 0:001 (0:020)  0:049 (0:056)
t   17 0:012 (0:020) 0:045 (0:064)
t   18  0:015 (0:021) 0:035 (0:060)
t   19 0:011 (0:022)  0:058 (0:081)
t   20 0:032 (0:021) 0:052 (0:075)
t   21 0:011 (0:021) 0:073 (0:072)
D. Additional Controls
Number of US troops deployed in Afghanistan 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000)
Dummy for after Red Mosque Seige (4 July 2007)  0:028 (0:032)  0:016 (0:177)
Dummy for Obama Admin (21 Jan 2009 onwards) 0:045 (0:040) 0:352 (0:238)
Dummy for Malakand Accord (15 Feb to 30 April 2009)  0:035 (0:055)  0:264 (0:274)
1. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1 Jan to 31 May 2008) 0:004 (0:042)  0:078 (0:222)
2. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (23 Sept to 31 Oct 2008)  0:054 (0:057) 0:141 (0:214)
3. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1-31 May 2009) 0:011 (0:034) 0:178 (0:377)





Test of Joint Signicance
excluding (A). Drone Strikes 0:338 0:243
excluding (C). Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Pakistan 0:106 0:005






1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center. Terrorist incidents are restricted to those where the perpetrator
was identied as Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
2 Sample restricted to 1440 days (number of observations) between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010.
3 Regressions include day of week indicators.
4 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors.
5  signicant at the 5% level,
 signicant at the 2:5% level,
 signicant at the 1% level.
22Table 4: Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Pakistan
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
A. Drone Strikes
t   1 0:080 (0:050) 0:065 (0:059)
t   2  0:048 (0:037)  0:111
 (0:046)
t   3  0:038 (0:038)  0:034 (0:050)
t   4 0:046 (0:040) 0:094 (0:059)
t   5 0:081
 (0:035) 0:050 (0:045)
t   6 0:067 (0:041) 0:080 (0:063)
t   7 0:013 (0:040) 0:004 (0:056)
t   8  0:041 (0:045) 0:033 (0:067)
t   9  0:001 (0:036) 0:029 (0:054)
t   10 0:043 (0:042) 0:002 (0:067)
t   11 0:034 (0:045) 0:022 (0:057)
t   12  0:038 (0:040)  0:131
 (0:048)
t   13  0:090
 (0:039) 0:027 (0:062)
t   14 0:009 (0:038) 0:051 (0:056)
t   15 0:001 (0:042)  0:031 (0:061)
t   16 0:010 (0:041) 0:019 (0:061)
t   17 0:069 (0:040) 0:073 (0:063)
t   18 0:016 (0:039)  0:028 (0:050)
t   19 0:040 (0:041) 0:016 (0:062)
t   20  0:043 (0:051)  0:054 (0:062)
t   21 0:021 (0:039) 0:068 (0:072)
B. Terrorist Attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan
t   1  0:021 (0:030) 0:004 (0:007)
t   2  0:024 (0:030)  0:003 (0:007)
t   3  0:016 (0:030) 0:008 (0:008)
t   4 0:043 (0:036)  0:005 (0:006)
t   5  0:028 (0:037)  0:008 (0:006)
t   6  0:017 (0:034) 0:003 (0:007)
t   7  0:061 (0:034) 0:015
 (0:006)
t   8 0:038 (0:032)  0:001 (0:007)
t   9  0:026 (0:034)  0:004 (0:006)
t   10 0:004 (0:036)  0:004 (0:006)
t   11 0:023 (0:037)  0:004 (0:007)
t   12 0:026 (0:033)  0:002 (0:005)
t   13  0:031 (0:035)  0:005 (0:007)
t   14  0:010 (0:032) 0:000 (0:007)
t   15  0:013 (0:036) 0:023 (0:012)
t   16  0:093
 (0:033)  0:022
 (0:008)
t   17 0:045 (0:035)  0:003 (0:006)
t   18 0:014 (0:035) 0:005 (0:009)
t   19  0:009 (0:041) 0:008 (0:006)
t   20 0:020 (0:039)  0:006 (0:006)
t   21  0:037 (0:032) 0:004 (0:006)
continued
23Table 4: Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Pakistan
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
C. Terrorist Attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan
t   1 0:123
 (0:025) 0:164
 (0:037)
t   2 0:025 (0:027) 0:035 (0:027)
t   3 0:035 (0:024) 0:018 (0:029)
t   4  0:005 (0:028)  0:002 (0:028)
t   5 0:024 (0:029) 0:013 (0:034)
t   6 0:023 (0:027) 0:093
 (0:037)
t   7 0:015 (0:025)  0:015 (0:042)
t   8 0:059
 (0:029) 0:073 (0:038)
t   9 0:039 (0:027) 0:069
 (0:032)
t   10  0:039 (0:026)  0:016 (0:036)
t   11 0:024 (0:030) 0:073
 (0:033)
t   12 0:001 (0:027) 0:014 (0:036)
t   13 0:009 (0:028) 0:039 (0:031)
t   14 0:015 (0:031)  0:038 (0:031)
t   15 0:022 (0:027) 0:037 (0:027)
t   16  0:051 (0:026)  0:033 (0:031)
t   17 0:054 (0:027) 0:015 (0:027)
t   18  0:023 (0:027)  0:042 (0:031)
t   19 0:001 (0:026) 0:036 (0:035)
t   20 0:058
 (0:028) 0:013 (0:034)
t   21 0:022 (0:028) 0:017 (0:030)
D. Additional Controls
Number of US troops deployed in Afghanistan 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000)
Dummy for after Red Mosque Seige (4 July 2007) 0:123
 (0:046) 0:228
 (0:078)
Dummy for Obama Admin (21 Jan 2009 onwards) 0:027 (0:056) 0:011 (0:114)
Dummy for Malakand Accord (15 Feb to 30 April 2009) 0:054 (0:048) 0:081 (0:114)
1. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1 Jan to 31 May 2008)  0:136
 (0:054)  0:194
 (0:090)
2. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (23 Sept to 31 Oct 2008) 0:029 (0:087)  0:011 (0:142)
3. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1-31 May 2009) 0:190
 (0:069) 0:400 (0:450)
4. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (18 Oct to 12 Dec 2009)  0:077 (0:040)  0:099 (0:068)
Constant 0:262
 (0:077) 0:091 (0:076)
Test of Joint Signicance
excluding (A). Drone Strikes 0:005
 0:002

excluding (B). Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Afghanistan 0:055 0:000





1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center. Terrorist incidents are restricted to those where the perpetrator
was identied as Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
2 Sample restricted to 1440 days (number of observations) between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010.
3 Regressions include day of week indicators.
4 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors.
5  signicant at the 5% level,
 signicant at the 2:5% level,
 signicant at the 1% level.
24Table 5: Test of Joint Signicance (p-value) for dierent lag structures
A. Daily Drone Strikes Reaction Functions
Lag Structure Incidence of Strikes Number of Strikes
exclude B exclude C exclude B exclude C






(21,21,21) 0:364 0:160 0:000
 0:002

B. Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Afghanistan
Lag Structure Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
exclude A exclude C exclude A exclude C
(7,7,7) 0:180 0:439 0:487 0:265
(14,14,14) 0:620 0:058 0:508 0:038

(21,21,21) 0:338 0:106 0:243 0:005

C. Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Pakistan
Lag Structure Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks











1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents
Tracking System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center. Terrorist incidents are restricted to those
where the perpetrator was identied as Taliban or Al-Qaeda. Data is used for the time period January 2007 to
December 2010.
2 Tests of joint signicance are carried out on OLS regressions of (A) Daily Drone Strikes, (B) Daily Terrorist
Attacks in Afghanistan and (C) Daily Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan on lags of Drone Strikes, Terrorist Attacks
in Afghanistan and Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan. Regressions are estimated with the given lag length. Each
regression includes the controls specied in (D) in tables 2, 3 and 4 as well as day of week indicators. Standard
errors are heteroscedasticity/autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors.
3  signicant at the 5% level,
 signicant at the 2:5% level,
 signicant at the 1% level.
25Table 6: Test of Joint Signicance (p-value) for dierent Time Aggregations
A. Drone Strikes Reaction Functions
Time Aggregation Number of Strikes
exclude B exclude C
Daily, 21 lags 0:000
 0:002

Weekly, 3 lags 0:524 0:485
Monthly, 1 lag 0:943 0:465
B. Taliban Reaction Functions in Afghanistan
Time Aggregation Number of Attacks
exclude A exclude C
Daily, 21 lags 0:243 0:005

Weekly, 3 lags 0:118 0:686
Monthly, 1 lag 0:000
 0:867
C. Taliban Reaction Functions in Pakistan
Time Aggregation Number of Attacks
exclude A exclude B
Daily, 21 lags 0:002
 0:000

Weekly, 3 lags 0:426 0:329
Monthly, 1 lag 0:375 0:886
1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source:
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center.
Terrorist incidents are restricted to those where the perpetrator was identied as Taliban
or Al-Qaeda. Data is used for the time period January 2007 to December 2010.
2 Tests of joint signicance are carried out on OLS regressions of (A) Drone Strikes, (B)
Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan and (C) Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan on lags of Drone
Strikes, Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan and Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan. Regres-
sions are estimated with the given time aggregation (daily, weekly and monthly) and lag
length. Each regression includes the controls specied in (D) in tables 2, 3 and 4 as well
as day of week/week or month of year indicators. Standard errors are heteroscedastic-
ity/autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors.
3  signicant at the 5% level,
 signicant at the 2:5% level,
 signicant at the 1%
level.
26Table 7: Test of Joint Signicance (p-value) for lethal and suicide attacks by the Taliban
A. Daily Drone Strikes Reaction Functions
Type of Taliban Attack Incidence of Strikes Number of Strikes
exclude B exclude C exclude B exclude C
All Taliban Attacks 0:364 0:160 0:000
 0:002

Lethal Taliban Attacks 0:075 0:462 0:253 0:704
Suicide Taliban Attacks 0:094 0:092 0:035
 0:305
B. Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Afghanistan
Type of Taliban Attack Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
exclude A exclude C exclude A exclude C
All Taliban Attacks 0:338 0:106 0:243 0:005

Lethal Taliban Attacks 0:078 0:396 0:662 0:006

Suicide Taliban Attacks 0:058 0:004
 0:125 0:010

C. Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Pakistan
Type of Taliban Attack Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
exclude A exclude B exclude A exclude B




Lethal Taliban Attacks 0:031
 0:072 0:102 0:043

Suicide Taliban Attacks 0:064 0:005
 0:514 0:264
1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents
Tracking System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center. Terrorist incidents are restricted to those
where the perpetrator was identied as Taliban or Al-Qaeda. Data is used for the time period January 2007 to
December 2010.
2 Tests of joint signicance are carried out on OLS regressions of (A) Daily Drone Strikes, (B) Daily Terrorist Attacks
in Afghanistan and (C) Daily Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan on twenty-one lags of Drone Strikes, Terrorist Attacks
in Afghanistan and Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan. Regressions are estimated with terrorist attacks restricted to all,
lethal or suicide terrorist attacks. Each regression includes the controls specied in (D) in tables 2, 3 and 4 as well
as day of week indicators. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity/autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard
errors.
3  signicant at the 5% level,
 signicant at the 2:5% level,
 signicant at the 1% level.
27Table 8: Daily Haqqani Reaction Functions, OLS specication
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
HA. Drone Strikes in Haqqani Base of Operations
t   1 0:010 (0:041)  0:055 (0:065)
t   2  0:065 (0:043)  0:183
 (0:068)
t   3  0:008 (0:043) 0:056 (0:114)
t   4  0:027 (0:058) 0:103 (0:136)
t   5  0:034 (0:044)  0:113 (0:116)
t   6  0:007 (0:050) 0:094 (0:090)
t   7 0:017 (0:048)  0:006 (0:066)
t   8 0:141
 (0:047) 0:146 (0:090)
t   9 0:027 (0:040) 0:213
 (0:105)
t   10  0:036 (0:040) 0:183 (0:236)
t   11  0:048 (0:052)  0:131 (0:101)
t   12 0:041 (0:051) 0:018 (0:099)
t   13  0:020 (0:044)  0:072 (0:057)
t   14 0:018 (0:050) 0:033 (0:080)
t   15  0:059 (0:056) 0:078 (0:174)
t   16  0:038 (0:050)  0:100 (0:090)
t   17  0:060 (0:047)  0:146 (0:098)
t   18 0:023 (0:048)  0:019 (0:080)
t   19  0:069 (0:046)  0:113 (0:079)
t   20  0:017 (0:047)  0:099 (0:084)
t   21  0:017 (0:043)  0:060 (0:102)
HB. Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Haqqani Areas of Combat
Operations
t   1 0:056
 (0:028) 0:050
 (0:023)
t   2 0:061
 (0:027) 0:051 (0:029)
t   3 0:061
 (0:029) 0:035 (0:026)
t   4 0:028 (0:026) 0:053 (0:030)
t   5 0:029 (0:026) 0:052 (0:029)
t   6  0:017 (0:026)  0:024 (0:026)
t   7 0:014 (0:027)  0:029 (0:026)
t   8 0:058
 (0:025) 0:032 (0:024)
t   9 0:039 (0:028) 0:059
 (0:024)
t   10 0:013 (0:026) 0:028 (0:024)
t   11 0:080
 (0:026) 0:042 (0:028)
t   12  0:015 (0:030) 0:027 (0:022)
t   13 0:052 (0:026) 0:046 (0:024)
t   14 0:039 (0:026) 0:031 (0:023)
t   15  0:034 (0:025)  0:028 (0:021)
t   16 0:039 (0:026) 0:037 (0:027)
t   17 0:018 (0:025) 0:003 (0:024)
t   18 0:038 (0:028) 0:003 (0:028)
t   19 0:038 (0:026) 0:059 (0:032)
t   20 0:049
 (0:023) 0:095
 (0:028)
t   21 0:025 (0:031) 0:033 (0:028)
continued
28Table 8: Daily Haqqani Reaction Functions, OLS specication
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
D. Additional Controls
Number of US troops deployed in Afghanistan 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000)
Dummy for after Red Mosque Seige (4 July 2007)  0:013 (0:041)  0:020 (0:087)
Dummy for Obama Admin (21 Jan 2009 onwards) 0:014 (0:050) 0:052 (0:100)
Dummy for Malakand Accord (15 Feb to 30 April 2009)  0:037 (0:071)  0:077 (0:157)
1. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1 Jan to 31 May 2008) 0:035 (0:055)  0:022 (0:113)
2. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (23 Sept to 31 Oct 2008) 0:015 (0:052) 0:042 (0:096)
3. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1-31 May 2009)  0:006 (0:057) 0:025 (0:152)






Test of Joint Signicance, p-value
excluding (HA). Drone Strikes in Haqqani Base of Operations 0:000
 0:002

1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center. Terrorist incidents are restricted to those where the perpetrator
was identied as Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
2 Haqqani Base of Operations are taken as areas in North Waziristan, Pakistan. Haqqani Areas of Combat Operations are
taken as areas in the states of Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Ghazni, Logar, Wardak, and Kabul (all in Afghanistan).
3 Sample restricted to 1440 days (number of observations) between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010.
4 Regressions include day of week indicators.
5 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors.
6  signicant at the 5% level,
 signicant at the 2:5% level,
 signicant at the 1% level.
29Table 9: Daily Mehsud Reaction Functions, OLS specication
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
MA. Drone Strikes in Mehsud Base of Operations
t   1 0:005 (0:070)  0:033 (0:077)
t   2 0:001 (0:070)  0:003 (0:063)
t   3 0:112 (0:061) 0:109 (0:068)
t   4 0:056 (0:076) 0:054 (0:084)
t   5 0:070 (0:060) 0:140 (0:087)
t   6 0:089 (0:063) 0:160 (0:094)
t   7  0:037 (0:066)  0:061 (0:063)
t   8  0:090 (0:058)  0:086 (0:067)
t   9 0:019 (0:054) 0:005 (0:071)
t   10 0:128 (0:072) 0:064 (0:068)
t   11 0:173
 (0:067) 0:186 (0:112)
t   12  0:063 (0:059)  0:093 (0:057)
t   13 0:109 (0:073) 0:074 (0:060)
t   14  0:141
 (0:047)  0:142
 (0:043)
t   15 0:009 (0:066)  0:061 (0:053)
t   16 0:000 (0:071)  0:014 (0:073)
t   17 0:004 (0:066)  0:008 (0:063)
t   18  0:049 (0:055)  0:051 (0:059)
t   19  0:042 (0:072)  0:049 (0:069)
t   20  0:015 (0:075)  0:019 (0:070)
t   21 0:023 (0:068)  0:022 (0:070)
MB. Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Mehsud Areas of Combat
Operations
t   1 0:114
 (0:031) 0:077
 (0:032)
t   2 0:077
 (0:029) 0:059
 (0:026)
t   3  0:023 (0:027)  0:025 (0:022)
t   4  0:018 (0:028)  0:015 (0:028)
t   5 0:068
 (0:028) 0:072
 (0:030)
t   6 0:021 (0:031) 0:097
 (0:045)
t   7  0:037 (0:031)  0:047 (0:031)
t   8 0:059 (0:030) 0:040 (0:030)
t   9 0:045 (0:028) 0:048 (0:024)
t   10  0:035 (0:029) 0:033 (0:039)
t   11 0:029 (0:027)  0:006 (0:026)
t   12 0:013 (0:028) 0:015 (0:026)
t   13  0:013 (0:025)  0:001 (0:028)
t   14 0:027 (0:030) 0:007 (0:025)
t   15 0:039 (0:029) 0:068
 (0:031)
t   16  0:001 (0:028) 0:011 (0:030)
t   17 0:028 (0:029) 0:024 (0:025)
t   18 0:008 (0:029)  0:013 (0:029)
t   19  0:012 (0:031) 0:048 (0:037)
t   20  0:007 (0:023)  0:018 (0:029)
t   21  0:005 (0:029)  0:009 (0:029)
continued
30Table 9: Daily Mehsud Reaction Functions, OLS specication
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
D. Additional Controls
Number of US troops deployed in Afghanistan 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000)
Dummy for after Red Mosque Seige (4 July 2007) 0:080
 (0:033) 0:104 (0:039)
Dummy for Obama Admin (21 Jan 2009 onwards) 0:021 (0:053)  0:010 (0:066)
Dummy for Malakand Accord (15 Feb to 30 April 2009) 0:059 (0:063) 0:073 (0:080)
1. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1 Jan to 31 May 2008)  0:051 (0:039)  0:060 (0:056)
2. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (23 Sept to 31 Oct 2008)  0:035 (0:053)  0:063 (0:064)
3. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1-31 May 2009) 0:075 (0:085) 0:097 (0:088)
4. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (18 Oct to 12 Dec 2009)  0:053 (0:027)  0:045 (0:043)
Constant 0:076
 (0:036) 0:072 (0:042)
Test of Joint Signicance, p-value
excluding (MA). Drone Strikes in Mehsud Base of Operations 0:000
 0:000

1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center. Terrorist incidents are restricted to those where the perpetrator
was identied as Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
2 Mehsud Base of Operations are taken as areas in South Waziristan, Pakistan. Mehsud Areas of Combat Operations are
taken as areas in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.
3 Sample restricted to 1440 days (number of observations) between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010.
4 Regressions include day of week indicators.
5 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors.
6  signicant at the 5% level,
 signicant at the 2:5% level,
 signicant at the 1% level.
31Table 10: Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Afghanistan to Success-
ful/Unsuccessful Drone Strikes, OLS Specication
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
A1. Successful Drone Strikes
t   1  0:002 (0:084)  0:456 (0:233)
t   2 0:023 (0:055) 0:131 (0:306)
t   3  0:004 (0:056)  0:165 (0:354)
t   4 0:081
 (0:040)  0:157 (0:248)
t   5 0:088
 (0:028) 0:051 (0:297)
t   6  0:024 (0:057) 0:029 (0:274)
t   7  0:074 (0:057) 0:139 (0:389)
t   8  0:073 (0:068) 0:429 (0:424)
t   9  0:037 (0:067) 0:189 (0:438)
t   10  0:031 (0:057)  0:505 (0:358)
t   11  0:029 (0:052)  0:317 (0:252)
t   12  0:028 (0:065)  0:322 (0:373)
t   13  0:114 (0:061)  0:547
 (0:248)
t   14 0:036 (0:058) 0:231 (0:408)
t   15 0:088 (0:049) 0:307 (0:369)
t   16 0:060 (0:061)  0:054 (0:296)
t   17 0:026 (0:054) 0:001 (0:353)
t   18 0:048 (0:056) 0:378 (0:330)
t   19 0:001 (0:058)  0:071 (0:417)
t   20 0:026 (0:059) 0:238 (0:313)
t   21  0:110 (0:062)  0:056 (0:345)
A2. Unsuccessful Drone Strikes
t   1 0:029 (0:026)  0:060 (0:200)
t   2  0:064
 (0:032)  0:242 (0:169)
t   3  0:018 (0:035) 0:456 (0:527)
t   4  0:004 (0:032) 0:465 (0:488)
t   5 0:041 (0:031)  0:607 (0:386)
t   6  0:066 (0:033)  0:032 (0:290)
t   7  0:016 (0:033)  0:150 (0:144)
t   8 0:018 (0:027)  0:214 (0:321)
t   9  0:007 (0:033) 0:269 (0:287)
t   10 0:015 (0:023) 0:753 (0:913)
t   11  0:022 (0:032)  0:203 (0:244)
t   12 0:000 (0:031) 0:139 (0:330)
t   13 0:012 (0:029)  0:099 (0:224)
t   14 0:033 (0:031) 0:016 (0:143)
t   15  0:016 (0:024) 0:416 (0:624)
t   16 0:019 (0:031)  0:344 (0:283)
t   17 0:033 (0:029)  0:399 (0:311)
t   18  0:014 (0:029)  0:059 (0:196)
t   19 0:026 (0:033)  0:113 (0:219)
t   20  0:043 (0:035)  0:027 (0:238)
t   21  0:038 (0:029)  0:410
 (0:205)
B. Terrorist Attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan
t   1 0:074
 (0:033) 0:064 (0:029)
t   2 0:073
 (0:026) 0:042
 (0:019)
t   3 0:021 (0:031) 0:011 (0:020)
t   4 0:005 (0:026) 0:028 (0:021)
t   5  0:003 (0:029) 0:013 (0:032)
t   6 0:040 (0:031)  0:022 (0:029)
t   7 0:018 (0:023)  0:002 (0:026)
t   8 0:026 (0:027) 0:030 (0:037)
t   9 0:041 (0:029) 0:054
 (0:022)
t   10  0:023 (0:023) 0:027 (0:016)
t   11 0:061 (0:034)  0:011 (0:044)
continued
32Table 10: Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Afghanistan to Success-
ful/Unsuccessful Drone Strikes, OLS Specication
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
t   12 0:044 (0:029) 0:013 (0:019)
t   13 0:016 (0:026) 0:111
 (0:053)
t   14 0:024 (0:029)  0:010 (0:029)
t   15  0:047 (0:028) 0:024 (0:028)
t   16 0:066
 (0:030) 0:025
 (0:035)
t   17 0:030 (0:032) 0:051 (0:019)
t   18  0:023 (0:023) 0:004 (0:027)
t   19 0:041 (0:027) 0:062 (0:040)
t   20 0:047 (0:033) 0:048 (0:025)
t   21  0:002 (0:027) 0:016 (0:036)
C. Terrorist Attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan
t   1 0:032 (0:020) 0:002 (0:063)
t   2  0:005 (0:022)  0:020 (0:048)
t   3  0:034 (0:020)  0:098 (0:063)
t   4 0:001 (0:023) 0:065 (0:059)
t   5 0:023 (0:020)  0:011 (0:088)
t   6 0:003 (0:019)  0:042 (0:057)
t   7  0:007 (0:021)  0:042 (0:062)
t   8  0:056
 (0:020)  0:114
 (0:055)
t   9 0:029 (0:020)  0:065 (0:074)
t   10 0:003 (0:021)  0:005 (0:069)
t   11 0:017 (0:020) 0:044 (0:056)
t   12  0:020 (0:021) 0:122 (0:125)
t   13  0:002 (0:020)  0:043 (0:063)
t   14  0:032 (0:021)  0:011 (0:084)
t   15 0:024 (0:022)  0:021 (0:101)
t   16  0:001 (0:020)  0:067 (0:059)
t   17 0:013 (0:021) 0:070 (0:057)
t   18  0:015 (0:020) 0:021 (0:063)
t   19 0:010 (0:022)  0:066 (0:083)
t   20 0:030 (0:022) 0:070 (0:070)
t   21 0:010 (0:021) 0:075 (0:071)
D. Additional Controls
Number of US troops deployed in Afghanistan 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000)
Dummy for after Red Mosque Seige (4 July 2007)  0:028 (0:032)  0:009 (0:196)
Dummy for Obama Admin (21 Jan 2009 onwards) 0:045 (0:041) 0:332 (0:244)
Dummy for Malakand Accord (15 Feb to 30 April 2009)  0:031 (0:056)  0:245 (0:311)
1. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1 Jan to 31 May 2008) 0:004 (0:042)  0:078 (0:238)
2. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (23 Sept to 31 Oct 2008)  0:048 (0:055) 0:125 (0:215)
3. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1-31 May 2009) 0:011 (0:033) 0:188 (0:388)





Test of Joint Signicance, p-value
excluding (A1). Successful Drone Strikes 0:145 0:010

excluding (A2). Unsuccessful Drone Strikes 0:500 0:056
excluding (C). Terrorist Attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan 0:087 0:018

1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center. Terrorist incidents are restricted to those where the perpetrator
was identied as Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
2 Sample restricted to 1440 days (number of observations) between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010.
3 Regressions include day of week indicators.
4 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors.
5  signicant at the 5% level,
 signicant at the 2:5% level,
 signicant at the 1% level.
33Table 11: Daily Taliban Reaction Functions in Pakistan to Success-
ful/Unsuccessful Drone Strikes, OLS Specication
Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
A1. Successful Drone Strikes
t   1 0:141 (0:087) 0:250
 (0:123)
t   2 0:027 (0:080)  0:124 (0:095)
t   3  0:177
 (0:070)  0:098 (0:163)
t   4 0:005 (0:082)  0:014 (0:150)
t   5 0:071 (0:074) 0:221 (0:174)
t   6 0:071 (0:083) 0:057 (0:174)
t   7 0:122 (0:082) 0:235 (0:164)
t   8 0:031 (0:092) 0:085 (0:152)
t   9  0:086 (0:071)  0:051 (0:150)
t   10 0:134 (0:086) 0:264 (0:140)
t   11  0:065 (0:081) 0:154 (0:195)
t   12 0:131 (0:085) 0:008 (0:125)
t   13 0:084 (0:082) 0:246 (0:179)
t   14  0:106 (0:072)  0:255 (0:133)
t   15 0:111 (0:080) 0:065 (0:137)
t   16 0:050 (0:077) 0:223 (0:197)
t   17 0:093 (0:083)  0:018 (0:144)
t   18 0:083 (0:098)  0:017 (0:184)
t   19  0:018 (0:098)  0:159 (0:150)
t   20 0:047 (0:098) 0:121 (0:174)
t   21 0:145 (0:082) 0:268 (0:176)
A2. Unsuccessful Drone Strikes
t   1 0:065 (0:049) 0:031 (0:064)
t   2  0:045 (0:042)  0:103
 (0:053)
t   3 0:001 (0:043)  0:010 (0:056)
t   4 0:051 (0:045) 0:113 (0:067)
t   5 0:085
 (0:042) 0:041 (0:051)
t   6 0:058 (0:047) 0:088 (0:060)
t   7  0:010 (0:040)  0:036 (0:054)
t   8  0:042 (0:045) 0:034 (0:071)
t   9 0:031 (0:042) 0:050 (0:061)
t   10 0:026 (0:046)  0:052 (0:075)
t   11 0:062 (0:046) 0:014 (0:052)
t   12  0:083 (0:043)  0:153
 (0:050)
t   13  0:130
 (0:041)  0:010 (0:062)
t   14 0:051 (0:045) 0:110 (0:066)
t   15  0:031 (0:046)  0:044 (0:065)
t   16 0:007 (0:045) 0:000 (0:062)
t   17 0:063 (0:048) 0:120 (0:071)
t   18  0:002 (0:043)  0:036 (0:056)
t   19 0:051 (0:043) 0:035 (0:068)
t   20  0:070 (0:058)  0:087 (0:065)
t   21  0:024 (0:042) 0:034 (0:085)
B. Terrorist Attacks by the Taliban in Afghanistan
t   1  0:024 (0:030) 0:005 (0:007)
t   2  0:024 (0:030)  0:004 (0:008)
t   3  0:017 (0:031) 0:008 (0:007)
t   4 0:046 (0:035)  0:006 (0:006)
t   5  0:021 (0:038)  0:008 (0:006)
t   6  0:023 (0:033) 0:005 (0:007)
t   7  0:059 (0:034) 0:014
 (0:007)
t   8 0:037 (0:032)  0:003 (0:008)
t   9  0:022 (0:034)  0:002 (0:006)
t   10 0:007 (0:036)  0:001 (0:006)
t   11 0:018 (0:037)  0:002 (0:007)
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Incidence of Attacks Number of Attacks
Coecient SE Coecient SE
t   12 0:034 (0:033)  0:001 (0:006)
t   13  0:027 (0:035)  0:005 (0:007)
t   14  0:016 (0:033)  0:001 (0:008)
t   15  0:008 (0:036) 0:024 (0:013)
t   16  0:097
 (0:033)  0:020
 (0:008)
t   17 0:049 (0:035)  0:004 (0:006)
t   18 0:014 (0:035) 0:005 (0:009)
t   19  0:019 (0:041) 0:007 (0:006)
t   20 0:028 (0:038)  0:006 (0:007)
t   21  0:033 (0:032) 0:009 (0:007)
C. Terrorist Attacks by the Taliban in Pakistan
t   1 0:126
 (0:025) 0:167
 (0:038)
t   2 0:025 (0:027) 0:035 (0:027)
t   3 0:029 (0:024) 0:012 (0:028)
t   4  0:002 (0:029) 0:002 (0:029)
t   5 0:015 (0:030) 0:004 (0:033)
t   6 0:019 (0:028) 0:096
 (0:040)
t   7 0:021 (0:027)  0:011 (0:041)
t   8 0:053 (0:029) 0:072
 (0:036)
t   9 0:040 (0:027) 0:069
 (0:033)
t   10  0:040 (0:026)  0:019 (0:035)
t   11 0:025 (0:028) 0:074
 (0:034)
t   12  0:002 (0:028) 0:011 (0:037)
t   13 0:017 (0:029) 0:044 (0:031)
t   14 0:013 (0:031)  0:037 (0:031)
t   15 0:021 (0:027) 0:031 (0:027)
t   16  0:045 (0:027)  0:025 (0:031)
t   17 0:052 (0:028) 0:014 (0:027)
t   18  0:024 (0:027)  0:043 (0:030)
t   19 0:001 (0:027) 0:040 (0:036)
t   20 0:058
 (0:028) 0:011 (0:033)
t   21 0:027 (0:028) 0:017 (0:031)
D. Additional Controls
Number of US troops deployed in Afghanistan 0:000 (0:000) 0:000 (0:000)
Dummy for after Red Mosque Seige (4 July 2007) 0:110
 (0:046) 0:199
 (0:073)
Dummy for Obama Admin (21 Jan 2009 onwards) 0:005 (0:062)  0:017 (0:131)
Dummy for Malakand Accord (15 Feb to 30 April 2009) 0:097 (0:059) 0:146 (0:138)
1. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1 Jan to 31 May 2008)  0:131
 (0:053)  0:178
 (0:086)
2. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (23 Sept to 31 Oct 2008) 0:009 (0:077)  0:047 (0:145)
3. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (1-31 May 2009) 0:207
 (0:071) 0:413 (0:450)
4. Dummy for Pakistan Military Oensive (18 Oct to 12 Dec 2009)  0:054 (0:045)  0:054 (0:081)
Constant 0:242
 (0:080) 0:066 (0:079)
Test of Joint Signicance, p-value
excluding (A1). Successful Drone Strikes 0:000
 0:035

excluding (A2). Unsuccessful Drone Strikes 0:000
 0:001

excluding (B). Terrorist Attacks by Taliban in Afghanistan 0:027
 0:000

1 Drone Strikes data, source: New America Foundation. Terrorist incidents data, source: Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System, collected by the National Counterterrorism Center. Terrorist incidents are restricted to those where the perpetrator
was identied as Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
2 Sample restricted to 1440 days (number of observations) between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010.
3 Regressions include day of week indicators.
4 Heteroscedasticity/Autocorrelation corrected Newey-West standard errors.
5  signicant at the 5% level,
 signicant at the 2:5% level,
 signicant at the 1% level.
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